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AMENDMENT OF CORPORATE CHARTERS
In 1819, the United States Supreme Court in Dartnwuth Co7-
lege v. Woodward' declared that a charter granted by a state to a
corporation is a contract; that any attempt by the legislature to
amend or repeal that charter is an impairment of the obligation of
contracts forbidden by the Federal Constitution.2 In his concur-
ring opinion, 1Ur. Justice Story advised that this result might be
obviated by the states' reserving power to amend or repeal. 3 The
states have taken his advice by reservations in the charter itself,- in
general statutes," or in the state constitutions.6
117 U. S. 518, 4 L. ed. 629 (1819).
2 U. S. CoNST. Art. I, § 10; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 4.
317 U. S. 518, 712, 4 L. ed. 629 (1819).
4 Davis v. Louisville G. & E. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 At]. 654 (1928), re-
ferred to in W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 31, art. 1, § 8.
,W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 31, art. 1, § 8, applied Cross v. W. Va.
C. & P. Ry. Co., 35 W. Va. 174, 12 S. E. 1071 (1891) ; Germer v. Oil & Gas Co.,
60 W. Va. 143, 54 S. E. 509 (1906); Tabler v. Higginbotham, 110 W. Va. 9,
14,156 S. E. 751 (1931).
6 Miller v. New York, 82 U. S. 478 (1872).
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STUDENT NOTES
"As it rests in the legislative will to repeal the charter of a
corporation and destroy its life, so it may prescribe such conditions
as it chooses to the continued enjoyment of its franchise. It is
readily seen that by means of this control, the legislature may regu-
late any and all affairs of a corporation through the simple medium
of conditioning its right to exist as a corporation.'" Although
some cases8 seem to bear out this observation, it is generally ad-
mitted that there are limits to the states' amendatory rights,0 more
particularly the states' rights to endow the majority of stockholders
in a corporation with the power to effect changes binding on a dis-
senting minority. These limits, however, are hazy. Several tests
have been laid down, but applying them to almost any state of
facts, at first instance, one may reach whichever conclusion he
favors. These tests might be classed: the "public policy" test,
the "fundamental change" test, and the "vested rights" test.10
It may be seen that these tests are in fact incidents of due process,
which is the ultimate test; for whereas the "Dartmouth College
clauses"" remove the prohibition against the impairment of con-
tracts, they do not affect the protection of the due process clause."2
In Hinkley v. Sc7hwartzchtild & Sulzberger Co.,13 the New York
court collates the decisions of its own and other courts on the sub-
ject of amendments and from these evolves the rule that although
there is a limit to the states' power to amend, a state may empower
any amendment which is necessary for the public good. Apply-
ing its test to the set of facts before it, the court held that two-
thirds of the stockholders could change the financial set-up of the
corporation although the law at the time the corporation was
formed required unanimous vote to effect this type of change. The
court felt that the statute authorizing the amendment evidenced
the state's policy to promote corporate purposes, enhance their
welfare and extend their businesses; that methods of financing
came within this policy. This principle is applied and broadened
71Tinkley v. Schwartzchild & S. Co., 107 App. Div. 470, 95 X. Y. S. 357,
359 (1905).
8 Davis v. Louisville G. & E. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 AtI. 654 (1928);
Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
9 Hinkley v. Schwartzehild & S. Co., 107 App. Div. 470, 95 N. Y. S. 357
(1905) ; Looker v. Maynard, 179 U. S. 46, 21 S. Ct. 21 (1900).
10 Looker v. Maynard, 179 U. S. 46, 52, 21 S. Ct. 21 (1900).
" Savings clauses adopted after the Dartmouth College ease.
12 107 App. Div. 470, 95 N. Y. S. 357 (1905).
". County of San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 13 Fed. 722 (C. C. D. Cal.
1882).
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by the Delaware court 14 to include all amendments authorized by
general statutes, reasoning that the state by dealing with the sub-
ject by statute, rather than by leaving it to the corporation, im-
pliedly decides what is to the best public interest. In Keller v. Wil-
son," the Delaware court stems the tide by pointing out that the
state is also interested in protecting the rights of minority stock-
holders. Two questions arise from these decisions that leave this
paternal approach a rationalization rather than a test. What is the
public policy? And what affects public rather than private inter-
ests ?
The case establishing the fundamental change test is the Eng-
lish partnership case of NatschL v. Irving,"' in which a holder of a
£150 interest in a £5,000,000 partnership was permitted to enjoin
a life and fire insurance company from going into the marine in-
surance business. The change was attempted after a prohibition
on partnerships to write marine insurance had been removed. The
court said that the statute was permissive only. The complainant
had bought an interest in a comparatively safe investment. His
interest was not to be forced out or endangered by a change in the
purpose of the company. The American cases'" say that no change
may be effected under the reserved right to amend or repeal that
would change the fundamental purpose of the corporation. Courts
disagree as to what constitutes a fundamental change.'
A series of Delaware cases dealing with cumulative dividends
illustrates the vested rights doctrine. What is a vested right has
always been a "puzzler."' ' 9 "The tendency of the courts to dis-
cover a vested right has varied directly with the practical impor-
14 Davis v. Louisville G. & E. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 Atl. 654 (1928).
";190 Atl. 115 (Del. 1936).
16 Gow, PARTNERSHIP (2d ed. 1830) 576.
17 Germer v. Oil & Gas Co., 60 W. Va. 143, 54 S. E. 509, 522 (1906) (dis-
sent); Looker v. Maynard, 179 U. S. 46, 52, 21 S. Ct. 21 (1900) ; Berea Col-
lege v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45, 29 S. Ct. 33 (1908).
's Consolidation: fundamental change: 3 COOK, CORPOPATioNs (8th ed.
1923) § 671; Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land & Cattle Co., 34 Ariz. 245, 270 Pac.
1044 (1928). Not fundamental change: Durfee v. Old Colony Ry. Co., 87
Mass. 230 (1862). Change in capital stock: held fundamental change: Randle
v. Winona Coal Co., 206 Ala. 254, 89 So. 790 (1921). Contra: Hinkley v.
Schwartzehild & S. Co., 107 App. Div. 470, 95 N. Y. S. 357 (1905); Whatman
v. Consol. Gas Co., 148 Md. 90, 129 AtI. 22 (1925).
19 Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696
(1923) holds right to accrued cumulative dividends vested right. Harr v.
Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933). Contra: Breslav
v. N. Y. & Queens Elec. Light & Power Co., 249 App. Div. 181, 291 N. Y. S.
932 (1936) finds vested right to have stock remain uncallable because can
find no ease which holds otherwise.
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tance of the interest destroyed by the alteration and inversely with
the advantage of the change." 20 Morris v. American Public Util-
ities2' established that accrued unpaid dividends are a debt between
stockholders and therefore are a vested right which cannot be
divested by amendment. Succeeding cases deal with the effect of
the 1927 amendment to section 26 of the Delaware corporation law23
on this holding. The statute provides for changes in preferences,
participation, or any other special rights of stocks. The federal
court23 and the lower Delaware court2V4 held the Morris case over-
ruled by the statute. These cases would lead to the result that all
rights are defeasible since each person takes rights in a corporation
knowing that they are subject to being divested. Keller v. Wilson 20
disagrees with that conclusion, holding that the statute was not
meant to get around the Morris case, and if it were, it was uncon-
stitutional to the extent that it purported to affect rights vested be-
fore it was passed. A similar case,26 concerning a corporation
formed after the 1927 amendment, came to the Delaware Chan-
cellor in 1937. He applied the Keller case notwithstanding. The
upper court refused to pass upon the applicability of the Keller
case, dismissing the appeal on a procedural consideration.
West Virginia by liberalizing her laws to conform with the
corporation code of Delaware.27 has opened her courts to this type
of litigation. The stand our court takes on this question will no
doubt have a great deal to do with whether or not the state will
draw corporate business. On the one hand there is the consider-
ation that minority stockholders are today predominantly small
investors.&28 They know nothing of corporate finance. Therefore,
courts should not allow such amendments as would hazard or de-
preciate the value of stocks owned by these investors. On the other
hand is the warning uttered by the federal court in Harr v. Pioneer
Mechanical Corporation," let he who takes advantage of the Dela-
20 Note (1931) 31 Con. L. REV. 1163.
21 Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696
(1923).
22 34 Del. Laws, e. 34, art. 112, § 7. See W. VA. REV. CODE (Michle, 1937)
a. 31, art. 1, § 11.
23 Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
24 Keller v. Wilson, 180 AtL 584 (Del. Ch. 1935).
25 190 AtI. 115 (Del. 1936).
28 Johnson v. Consol. Film Industries, 192 AtI. 603 (Del. 1937).
27 Committee's note, W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 31, art. 1, § 11.
28 STEVENS, CORPORATIONS (1936) 453.
29 65 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
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ware corporation laws take heed of its burdens. To base limitations
on power of amendment on the latter principle would be to penalize
stockholders for the sins of the corporation, for the average in-
vestor does not investigate the laws of the incorporating state.
F. W. L.
DERIVATIVE STOCKHOLDER'S SUITS
IN WEST VIRGINIA
Our courts have shown no inclination to depart from the rules
laid down by the cases which are generally recognized as authority
in this country. Statutes have played little or no part in the
development of this topic in West Virginia, and it is probable that
a consultation of the leading texts' will give as accurate a picture
of the future position of the court as any case study. The chief
difficulty lies in the fact that the subject of stockholder's suits,
while very important, is not a very controversial one, and where
the authorities split we are as likely to follow one side as the other,
and it is not easy to make a prediction in these cases on the basis
of a general attitude or trend.
There are about a dozen leading cases in this state, a study of
which will perhaps help to clarify the general outlines of the sub-
ject, and to determine our court's probable approach to any new
problem in it.
1. Who May Sue. If the suit involves dissolution of the cor-
poration not less than one-fifth in interest of the stockholders must
sue under our statute,2 but a receiver may be appointed for suf-
ficient cause at the suit of any stockholder. In general it seems
I' FLTnER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE Ls w OP PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Rev. ed.
1931) ; THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS (3rd ed. 1927); COOK, CoRPRokIoNs (8th
ed. 1923). These texts are cited in almost all the West Virginia cases on stock-
holder's suits.
2 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 1, § 81. The court has been rather
striet in requiring good cause to be shown for the application of this statute.
Ward v. Hotel Randolph Co., 65 W. Va. 721, 63 S. E. 613 (1908); Robinson
v. Weimer-Warren Co., 110 W. Va. 143, 157 S. E. 85 (1931); Law v. Rich,
47 W. Va. 634, 35 S. E. 858 (1900). See also Kyle v. Wagner, 45 W. Va. 349,
32 S. E. 213 (1898).
. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 1, § 82. See also on the appointment
of receivers for corporations, id. c. 56, art. 6, 99 1, 2.
4 Maxon's Adm'x v. Maxon-Miller Co., 53 W. Va. 150, 44 S. E. 131 (1903),;
Tierney v. United Pocahontas Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 545, 102 S. E. 249 (1920) ;
Campbell v. King's Daughter General Hospital, 96 W. Va. 539, 123 S. E. 396
(1924). 13 FLEzcEma, CORPORATIONS § 5975. But see 6 THOMPS N, CORPORA-
TioNS § 4576.
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